What if the Answer Really is 42–part 2

This is a continuation of What if the Answer Really is 42? from yesterday. Read yesterday’s post first, if you haven’t.

Biblically and theologically, the question is not, “why do the righteous suffer?” The question is not, “why do I suffer?” The question is not “is there a God?” All those questions will tend to result in nonsensical answers–42–because they are like asking “what happens when an irresistible force meets an unmovable object?” By definition, such a question is nonsense and any answer, other than to say it is nonsense, is essentially 42.

God’s existence is not postulated as an explanation for anything by the biblical writers. His existence is simply assumed, and he is then described by his actions.

Despite this, those who believe in God have, for many years, used God as the reason for why things happen: for why there is a universe, for how human beings come to be, or even, more recently, for how such things as eyes came to exist. Those who believe in God use that which people don’t understand or can’t explain as proofs that there must be a God.

The Bible, however, never does this. Perhaps that’s an important clue.

Moreover, consider this pattern of behavior from the backside, from those who reject God: we who believe in God do not fully understand why the righteous suffer, why sin exists, or why God doesn’t stop it. And yet, such ignorance of that which is sad is often used as proof by skeptics that there can be no God. They argue that if God existed, then surely there would be no suffering. And if those who believe in God can’t give an answer to that, then obviously, ipso facto, God has been demonstrated conclusively not to exist.

Is that question and argument really any more valid than using ignorance of how the universe began as proof that God does exist?

I don’t think so. Consider:

I’m walking along one morning and slip. I look at the floor and notice a pile of green goo. I don’t know why there is green goo on the floor. I don’t know where it came from. So of course I immediately conclude that God must have made it, thereby proving his existence.

The skeptic will wonder about how hard I must have banged my head on the floor. My conclusion is nonsense, he avers. If there was a God, then there would be no green goo at all, since the green goo is obviously bad. A good and loving God would never allow green goo to exist. Therefore, there must be no God.

Is either of us making reasonable arguments? Does either of us make sense? Does either of our conclusions follow logically from our premises?

And yet, when we theologians argue for the existence of God, or our opponents argue against him, we all use the same exact format, ask the same stupid questions, and everyone thinks we’re being profound. But I’m starting to think that we’re in fact being silly and just yelling “42!” at one another.

So what is the real question?

“Do I love God?” And the second is like it. “Do I love my neighbor?”

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About R.P. Nettelhorst

I'm married with three daughters. I live in southern California and I'm the interim pastor at Quartz Hill Community Church. I have written several books. I spent a couple of summers while I was in college working on a kibbutz in Israel. In 2004, I was a volunteer with the Ansari X-Prize at the winning launches of SpaceShipOne. Member of Society of Biblical Literature, American Academy of Religion, and The Authors Guild
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One Response to What if the Answer Really is 42–part 2

  1. Nick Joll says:

    Dear R.P. Nettelhorst

    I am afraid that I am unclear just what your objection to the ‘problem of evil’ argument is. That ‘problem of evil’ argument can be expressed as follows.

    (1) An omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent God could and would prevent the (at least relatively) innocent from suffering greatly. (Premise.)

    (2) The (at least relatively) innocent do suffer greatly. (Premise.)

    (3) There is no omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent God. (Inference from 1 and 2.)

    Are you rejecting either of the premises (i.e. saying that 1 and/or 2 is/are false)? Or are you granting the premises but denying that the conclusion (i.e. 3) follows from them? What you say about green goo somewhat suggests that you are taking that last strategy. But the existence of things that we can slip on is hardly the same as the suffering at issue in 2. Now, there are various alternative strategies (for rejecting either of the premises, or rejecting that the conclusion follows from them), but there are seemingly good replies to all the common versions of those strategies.

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